a rank and file backed by the major confederations. Given the political and religious divisions among the unions, unity among them could be constructed in one of two ways: either the confederations could act together on the basis of concrete workplace demands desired by an often apolitical and individualistic rank and file, or they could rely upon the lowest common political denominator, that is, the defense of democracy against a military or anti-Republican coup d'etat. On the latter foundation, at the end of the Algerian War from 1958 to 1962, the confederations came together sporadically to defend the Republic. During the miners' strike of March-April 1963, an alliance was reconstituted, but this time, as in 1953, on the basis of specific wage-and-hours goals. Union unity contributed to an important victory against an intransigent Gaullist regime which seemed to be no more reluctant to use its repressive forces than its counterpart had been in 1947-48. Several years later, in 1966, the two major confederations-the CGT and the renamed CFDT (Confederation francaise democratique du travail) solidified their alliance by signing a common platform. This platform included demands which, at least partially, prepared the way for the May 1968 strike wave. Both unions affirmed their opposition to the regime's wage policies and emphasized their determination to increase the salaries of the lowest-paid workers, who were often female, foreign, or young.
To understand workers' actions in 1968 some reference to the student movement is needed as well as background to the history of the postwar working-class movement. After all, what distinguished the French situation from that of other nations that experienced unrest in 1968 was the unique juncture of student and worker actions. It was the student revolt that eventually sparked the enormous work stoppage during the second half of May. Knowledgeable discussions of the origins of the student movement can be found in other works on 1968. For our purposes, it is sufficient to note that the agitation which began at the Nanterre campus in the winter of 1967-68 increased sharply during the spring, an habitual season of French revolts and revolutions. In early May the movement spread from Nanterre to Paris, that is, from the periphery of the capital to its center. On Monday, 6 May, student-police confrontations resulted in almost eight hundred injuries and over eighty arrests.3 The following day, student leaders formulated three major demands: freedom for those arrested, withdrawal of police forces from the university, and reopening of all campuses. These demands demonstrated that the crisis of the university had quickly affected the state, a relation that was natural given the centralization of the French educational system. A protest against the university was rapidly transformed into a protest against the state, in particular against what were considered its repressive policies and actions toward student demonstrators.
On 8 and 9 May discussions between student leaders and government officials proved incapable of resolving the conflict. During the night of 10-11 May, police attacked the barricades which the students had erected in the Latin Quarter. In the ensuing street battles, 274 police and 1 16 demonstrators were injured, 128 vehicles were damaged, and 60 set aflame. The major unions-CGT, CFDT, FO, various teachers' unions, and even the usually conservative Confederation generale des cadres (CGC)-reacted by momentarily overcoming their longstanding divisions to organize a twenty-four-hour general strike whose main goal was to protest government repression and to demonstrate solidarity with the students. On the night of 11 May, Georges Pompidou, the. prime minister, attempted to calm the agitation and resolve the student/state conflict by ceding to the demands of the student demonstrators. Pompidou ordered the reopening of the Sorbonne and amnesty for students who had been arrested. Thus, the state exhibited Janus-like behavior which alternated between repression and concession.
It is difficult to know to what degree the new lenient phase, which was characterized by Pompidou's concessions, encouraged participation in the general strike of Monday, 13 May. General de Gaulle, the president of the Republic, may have been correct in questioning the wisdom of what he considered his prime minister's surrender to disorderly students. At any rate, the Right in general and a major Parisian employers' organization, the Groupement des Industries Metallurgiques (GIM), in particular, attributed the success of the general strike of 13 May to the "weakness" [faiblesse] of the government.4 Whatever the verdict on the repercussions of government concessions to the students, the general strike of 13 May demonstrated union power and popular distrust of the police. On that day, although the "immense majority" of Parisian metallurgists reported to work, their workday was interrupted 4 Greve politique du 13 mai, 3 October 1968, Groupement des Industries MWtallurgiques, Neuilly (hereafter cited as GIM). See Dansette, Mai, 138; see also Jean Rochet, Cinq ans i la te'te de la DST (Paris, 1985), 70-90, which also argues that the movement was a result of Pompidou's lack of firmness. According to Maurice Grimaud, prefect of police during the strike wave, Pompidou wanted to avoid a savage repression which might have been the only way the movement could have been halted but which would have damaged his political career. See En mai, fais ce qu'il te plait (Paris, 1977).
by the strike. The employers evaluated strike participation at 19 percent of the workforce, but the number of those affected by transportation stoppages and the closing of firms was much higher. Workers of large firms were more likely to strike than their counterparts in medium or small enterprises. Most small businesses (under fifty workers)-which employed over a third of wage earners in commerce and industryremained untouched by the movement; however, almost 25 percent of wage earners in large firms participated, and 78 percent of big businesses were affected by the strike. These figures were a bad omen for the government and employers, because these large firms included aviation and automobile firms that were in the avant-garde of industrial development and represented the new, more concentrated and competitive sectors of the French economy in the late 1960s. The following weeks would show that many wage earners in these key sectors were responsive to work stoppages.
Immediately after the general strike on Monday, five strikes continued in metallurgical plants in the Paris region, and important work stoppages broke out in aviation and automobile firms in the provinces.5 Sud-Aviation near Nantes led the way on Tuesday, 14 May, by embarking upon the first major strike with occupation. Its example was followed by the Renault plants at Cleon on the fifteenth and by other Renault factories, including Boulogne-Billancourt, on Thursday the sixteenth. Georges Seguy, the secretary general of the CGT, noted that "workers understood that the government was put to the test and weakened by the confrontation [with the students] and that the moment had come to settle accounts."6 The head of the CGC, Andre Malterre, believed that the student strikes had opened the way for the factory occupations "by revealing the weakness of the government."7 Just as they did during other periods of French history, such as the Popular Front, wage earners took advantage of perceived permissiveness to advance their own interests. The sit-down tactic was chosen because strikers calculated that the government would be reluctant to use force to evacuate the factories.
A few strikes seem to have been undertaken spontaneously. expression put it, "metro, boulot, dodo ras le bol." Usually though, in almost all striking metallurgical firms, union militants interpreted workers' desires and formulated bargaining positions. Parisian metallurgical employers claimed that in their firms the strikes that immediately followed 13 May were not, contrary to many accounts, "spontaneous" but rather, caused by CGT militants,9 whose demands usually included salary increases, a reduction of the workweek, and job security.
The May, a number of them had systematically relied on police to combat strikes.
Industrialists in the western suburbs charged that CGT militants from Avions Marcel Dassault and other large enterprises encouraged the work stoppages while local municipalities controlled by the Left fed the strikers.15 Employers continued to attribute "responsibility" for most strikes to union militants, especially the CGT.16 Of the 77 strikes enumerated, CGT militants were responsible for 68, CFDT for 6, and FO for 3. In addition, industrialists reported that older and more experienced workers provoked the stoppages. Fifty-one out of 88 strikes (58 percent) were started by wage earners between 30 and 40 years old. Twenty-four (27 percent) were begun by 20-to 30-year olds. Only 7 (8 percent) were initiated by those under twenty. Workers who had labored in the firms for more than one year were leaders of 67 percent of the strikes. The meneurs, as employers called them, were largely French. Only 9 percent were foreign-3 Spanish "anarchists," 2 "insolent" Algerians, and several Poles, Italians, and Portuguese.
This information is significant because it modifies the common interpretation of May 1968 as a youth revolt. Instead, the employers' questionnaires indicate that relatively mature, stable, and unionized French workers were largely responsible for initiating metallurgical strikes in the Paris region. Maturity, though, did not exclude boldness. The industrialists noted that in 35 out of 41 reported strikes, workers used threats to convince their colleagues to stop work. In 16 of 60 strikes, militants resorted to force; yet they did not usually insult their bosses or sequester management. In only two cases was property damaged, but the threat of sabotage certainly existed. For example, several persons entered a factory at night and set a truck on fire. A police investigation was unable to conclude if the incident was caused by strike tensions or by a desire for "vengeance" on behalf of a worker who had been fired before May.
According to employers, the militants were seldom revolutionaries. Only 2 of those who fomented strikes belonged to organizations of gauchistes-Maoist, Castroist, Trotskyist, and so on. Nor was the direct influence of revolutionary or radical students consequential. Among strikers in the western ban lieue (Argenteuil-Bezons) which bordered on Nanterre, student radicals had contact with workers during only 9 of 88 strikes, and these were probably in the larger factories. Thus the brief fusion of the student and worker movements after 12 May was, in all likelihood, destined to unravel. The Parisian metallos were neither seeking the "correct" party nor the "right" revolutionary ideology. Immigrets seem somewhat marginal in this struggle. They often viewed the strike as a French work stoppage in which they played only a passive role.17 Their relative passivity was significant, because they composed approximately 15 percent of the workforce in Parisian metallurgy and were overwhelmingly present in the lowest-paid and least-skilled jobs. On assembly lines they might compose over half the workforce.
A number of working-class organizations encouraged strikers to demand autogestion or cogestion. The most forceful advocate of workers' control was the CFDT, whose secretary-general, Eugene Descamps, believed that the worker and student movements had the same democratic aspirations. He argued that the administrative and industrial "monarchies" must be replaced by democratic workers' control.'8 The CFDT saw autogestion as a way of distinguishing itself from its major rival and of bolstering its militancy on the shopfloor. The Action catholique ouvriere, which had fostered an important number of CFDT militants, was in complete "solidarity with the workers struggling to gain power in their firms and in society. Instead of autogestion, the major unions in metallurgy, the CGT, and even the CFDT, demanded less worktime and more pay, particularly for the lowest-paid workers, who were often foreigners, women, or young people.22 The latter demand signaled the resolve of union activists (generally male and French) to reach out to other social groups. Well before May, the CGT had made efforts to appeal to different sectors of the working class.23 In 1965 the CGT had called for a reduction of working hours for women. It campaigned in 1967 for equal wages and opportunities for working females. It was aware of "the double and profoundly social role of female workers as both wage earners and mothers." CGT militants demanded "the end of any type of discrimination against women" who composed approximately 20 percent of the metallurgical workforce.24 The CFDT too had called for equal pay for equal work, regardless of sex. In a special edition of its women's magazine, the CGT argued that females should also work less. Its activists claimed that a work-free Saturday and reduced worktime were even more necessary for women because "time-measurement and piecework has pushed them to the brink."25 Women were not the only objects of the unions' attentions. The confederations also wanted young workers and foreigners to participate as equals in the worlds of labor and leisure. Recognizing that "one out of four workers is foreign," the CGT lauded its "long tradition of internationalism" and supported the demands of the immigres.26 The unions urged the end to discrimination against foreigners and youth and demanded the suppression of the practice of paying lower wages to youthful wage earners. In 1967 Georges Seguy was named secretarygeneral of the CGT to rejuvenate the organization and to appeal to youth. Prior to May, the CGT made special efforts to recruit youth rebels who resisted factory discipline and the authority of supervisory personnel and who might otherwise have gravitated to gauchisme.27 Young activists insisted that employers pay for educational courses and sporting activities undertaken during working hours, housing for Conseil national du patronat fransais) , conceded a 35 percent hike in the minimum wage. Women, youth, and foreigners would tend to profit from this dramatic increase more than other wage earners. Madeleine Colin, a prominent official of the CGT, argued that "women and young people were among the principal beneficiaries of the raises" because "they constitute the majority of workers who earn the minimum wage." Some young women, she claimed, "saw their salary double."29 In comparison, higher-paid workers gained only a 10 percent increase. Thus, the CGT and the CFDT delivered on their 1966 promise to fight to win an increase in the minimum wage. The government quickly conceded the augmentation perhaps because it affected small-and medium-sized firms much more than the dynamic, large enterprises which the regime had continually favored.30 The Grenelle Agreement also guaranteed a reduction of the workweek-two hours for wage earners laboring more than 48 hours and one hour for those laboring between 45 and 48 hours. The agreement gave the employers the authority to recover the hours lost because of the strike. It recognized the unions' right to organize members, collect dues, and distribute literature.
When union leaders attempted to sell this agreement to the rank and file, strikers in certain large firms reacted with considerable hostility. Many metallos may have felt that the greatest strike wave in French history could and should produce more significant results. The ineffectiveness of the limited and partial strikes prior to May had frustrated large numbers of metallurgical workers who were anxious to take advan- tested the scare tactics of Gaullist "mercenaries," that is, members of civic action committees whom the general had encouraged to fight against the "subversion" of "totalitarian communism."'" Working-class militants became intimidated by threats to use military intervention against the strikers and by de Gaulle's success in rallying the entire Right. The CGT would later claim that its moderation prevented a Greek-or Indonesian-style coup in France.42 Following de Gaulle's address, pressure mounted for a return to work. The first strikers who returned were largely workers of small firms (employing between 20-300 wage earners) whose union representatives signed accords closely resembling the Grenelle settlement. These agreements were concluded during the first week of June, usually between Tuesday 4 and Friday 7.43 The relatively rapid return of the small firms was not surprising because their participation in the strike was much lower than that of the larger firms. Seventy-eight percent of the workers were affected by the strikes in large firms (over 2,000 workers), 76 percent in medium-sized firms (300-2,000 workers), and only 33 percent in small businesses (under 200 workers). An employers' organization in the eastern baneliue, whose members were mainly bosses of small-and medium-sized firms, reported that only 17 percent of their businesses went on strike.44 A left-wing Catholic activist concluded that "fear [of striking] affects small firms in particular, because they are not organized, offer low wages, and employ large numbers of women."45 A radical in one diminutive metallurgical factory (50 workers) noted the difficulty of organizing his fellow workers, even though the majority were under 35 years old. His workmates were reluctant to pay union dues and were skeptical of the union's effectiveness.46 Furthermore, the intensity of the strike diminished as firms decreased in size. In big firms each striker missed on the average 175 hours of work (almost 4 work weeks); in medium firms each striker averaged 117 hours (over 2.5 weeks); in small enterprises only 27 hours.
Monday, 10 June, saw a continuation of the pattern of a resolution of issues in moderate-sized enterprises but also initiated a workweek (Monday, 10 June to Friday, 15 June) which witnessed a return to work 41 The low level of participation in most occupied factories prefigured the poststrike atmosphere in which the overwhelming majority of workers were more concerned with surviving in a consumer society than with collective action against the state or employers. The minority of wage earners who were actively involved sometimes did so not because of trade-union or political concerns but rather for immediate, pragmatic reasons. In a number of factories, strike committees were responsible for distributing pay. In others, militants rationed gasoline, a scarce commodity during the latter half of May. Insufficient supply of gas provoked "a rush-a great demand" in a number of firms.57 An activist remarked: "We never occupied the factory but instead used it to supply our needs. . . . When we needed something we took it with or without the consent of the management.
Gas became scarce. . . In order to get fuel you had to have connections with the CGT. Gas produced envy and required discipline."58 One CGT member quit the union because it would not provide him with fuel.59
Given the desire and need to consume, pressures mounted for a return to work. Many wage earners were deep in debt before May, because large numbers of workers had been collectively responsible for the fourfold increase in credit purchases that had occurred during the 1960s.60 By 1968 almost all durable goods could be purchased on installment plans. At Renault, for example, young workers were often in arrears, and many older workers also had mortgage and car payments to meet. In fact, large automobile makers encouraged their personnel to purchase automobiles on credit by offering them considerable discounts. Many workers continued working, because their "women at home did not look favorably upon the strike."63 Many wives opposed the work stoppage because it unbalanced the family budget or, in higher income households, destroyed vacation plans. A Flins worker with radical tendencies explained to a strike sympathizer that his wife did not want to see him involved in the movement. Wives had a further reason for hostility to the work stoppages: school closings meant added child-care duties for them.64 As the strikes endured, women, perhaps even more than men, feared "politicalization," that is, the subordination of material demands of the movement to the political goals of parties and unions of the Left. Yet during the strike they pragmatically accepted the meals offered by municipalities controlled by the Left. As the work stoppages persisted, mature breadwinners seemed less determined to continue them than younger wage earners. 65 In those firms that rejected the Grenelle accord, the union delegation of each enterprise bargained directly with management and appealed to debtors and breadwinners by fighting to extend the gains of Grenelle. The duration of the strike in the biggest concerns may be attributed to the power of the unions (especially the CGT) which was able not only to appeal to the needs and desires of some workers but also to establish picket lines and discourage strikebreakers from returning to work.66 In a number of cases, these militants violated "the right to work" to prevent strikebreakers from entering the workplace. Employers cited four violations in early June, and conservative newspapers reported others, including incidents at the Flins Renault plant, which employed 10,000 workers.67 The CGT and other unions generally preferred to hold a public vote (with raised or lowered hands) to determine strike action. Employers believed that an open show of hands intimidated voters and argued that a secret ballot would facilitate a return to work. The government sided with industrialists on this issue, and its spokesman declared that "everytime a secret vote is taken, workers almost always decide to go back to work. What is certain is that the government must protect the right to work in order to fulfill its duty to the workers."68 Shortly thereafter, the police intervened spectacularly-and bloodily-at Flins. Given these pressures, the workweek of 10 June to 15 June saw an end to the work stoppage by most of the remaining large metallurgical firms of the Paris region. The votes on ending the strike stimulated a much greater turnout than the occupation itself. On 18 June, the day Renault returned to work, the president of the GIM reported that "almost all" the strikes had ended and that a maximum of 75,000 workers out of 750,000 remained engaged in work stoppages.79 Most of these strikes were settled by Monday, 24 June. Almost all sources indicate that those who resisted the return to work were young, and the delayed resumption of production can be attributed to their combativeness. Many were not as resigned to a life of wage labor and industrial discipline as older workers with greater familial responsibilities. The propensity of youth to be willing to participate in extended strikes was not, however, unique to 1968 and has occurred during other strike waves.80 Nevertheless, the heavy demographic weight of youth in the workforce had the probable effect of prolonging the strike wave in 1968.
In the second half of June, the gains of workers in the most advanced branches which had initiated the strikes-aviation, electrical construction, and automobiles-were the most impressive.8' In keeping with desires manifested during the first days of the strikes, management was forced to raise the salaries of its lowest-paid personnel even more than the Grenelle protocol had required. Youth, women, and foreigners were especially helped by this measure. In some enterprises, these categories won special treatment. In a number of firms, pregnant women gained one paid hour of rest per day and longer maternity leave. Mothers were also granted paid leave to care for a sick child. In others, those under eighteen won an additional two days of paid vacation. In keeping with wage earners' preference not to recover strike time, the union also won partial compensation for time missed. In other words, workers wanted the work stoppages to be treated as though they were paid vacations. This was especially important because the strike had aggravated an already considerable personal indebtedness.. In addition, most wage earners in large metallurgical factories won a shorter workweek than Grenelle had offered without a reduction of pay. Finally, the union militants were to be compensated for devoting a certain number of hours to union duties.
The unions emerged strengthened from their combat against the employers and the government. In Parisian metallurgy the CGT had led the greatest strike wave in history.82 Union activists reached out to youth, women, and foreigners. After the strikes ended, the CGT was able to enroll 400,000 new members nationally, many of whom may have been from the less remunerated categories of larger firms.83 The confederations were particularly effective in the larger metallurgical enterprises where they were able to broaden the gains of the Grenelle Agreement. For example, at Flins, union (CGT and CFDT) membership jumped from 7 to 15 percent. At Citroen, the CGT attracted 4,000 new members.
But union power had definite limits. It reached its zenith in May, when the state was weakened by its confrontation with students. The state's efforts to restore its authority in June placed militants on the defensive. At the same time, activists and their sympathizers also had to confront a largely uncommitted and sometimes hostile rank and file which was experiencing increasing social and familial pressures to return to work. Undoubtedly the seductions of consumer society were instrumental in convincing many workers to resume their posts, but a repressive state which was determined to make wage earners reenter the factories was also a key factor in ending the strikes in some of the most important enterprises in France. Following the strike wave, repressive government action encouraged a return to order and discipline in the factories. Encouraged by the state's coercive example, employers acted quickly to limit the influence of militants by employing private security forces and by restoring the authority of the supervisory personnel over both activists and rank and file.84 Discipline imposed in the streets and at the workplace furthered the development of the society of seductions. Workers continued to be more interested in acquiring commodities than in either revolutionary or reformist autogestion. They placed in large factories to attempt to maintain order in new spaces of mass consumption, such as supermarkets, shopping centers, and malls. While expanding their activities in the urban areas of consumption and production, police took on additional tasks in the leisure zones along the coasts and in the mountains. Thus, the decline of a classbased revolutionary project and the expansion of consumption and leisure by no means rendered the repressive forces superfluous. After May, adaptation to the society of seductions remained incomplete.
